Re-securitizing the borderlands of Kenya and Somalia to counter the operational influence of terrorist groups in the Horn of Africa region

Abstract

Terrorism in the twenty-first century continues to reshape state security systems, particularly in the Horn of Africa, where weak governance structures and porous borders create enabling environments for extremist groups. This paper examines the counter-terrorism strategies employed by the Republic of Kenya and the Federal Government of Somalia in mitigating the operational influence of terrorist organizations that not only conduct kinetic attacks but also seek to fill governance vacuums in marginalized border regions. Guided by neorealism and securitization theory, the study interrogates how state-centric power calculations and security discourses shape bilateral cooperation in confronting an asymmetric, transnational threat. The research engaged 313 respondents from Mandera (Kenya) and Bulahawo (Somalia) using an explanatory sequential mixed-methods design, supplemented with documentary and archival evidence. The findings show that institutional mistrust, overlapping jurisdictions, and persistent socio-economic marginalization curtail the impact of bilateral counter-terrorism efforts, despite their moderate operational effectiveness. These structural weaknesses enable militant groups to occupy governance gaps by providing rudimentary security, justice, and welfare functions in areas where the state presence remains limited. The study concludes that sustainable counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa requires a paradigm shift away from heavily militarized approaches toward human-security-oriented models that integrate community resilience, coordinated cross-border intelligence, and development-focused diplomacy. Achieving long-term stability therefore depends on transforming Kenya-Somalia cooperation from a predominantly military undertaking into a security-development compact capable of restoring state legitimacy in borderland regions.