Vol. 7 (Iss. 3) 2026, pp.625-636 African Journal of Empirical Research https://ajernet.net ISSN 2709-2607

# Assessing the effectiveness of climate financing through Kenya's climate change diplomacy

Ummi Bashir

ummibashirphd@gmail.com

United States International University-Africa

https://doi.org/10.51867/ajernet.7.3.52

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

**ABSTRACT**

Kenya has been a proactive participant in the global climate regimes to mobilise climate financing for adaptation, mitigation, and green development. However, the effectiveness of these resources remains disproportionate. This paper investigates why long-term climate diplomacy and extensive domestic institutional structures have not always been translated into coherent, country-owned, and transformative climate finance deliverables. In examining the effectiveness of climate financing through Kenya's climate change diplomacy, this study adopts the Rational Actor Model, which conceptualizes Kenya as a purposive actor seeking to maximize access to external finance and policy space within a fragmented international climate finance architecture. The study research question examines the extent to which Kenya's climate diplomacy has improved access to climate finance, how effectively the financial flows are coordinated and governed domestically, and whether existing arrangements translate into equitable and measurable climate outcomes. The study employs a qualitative approach, combining document analysis of policy frameworks, Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), and climate finance reports, with a review of peer-reviewed literature and official United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC] submissions to assess project outcomes, institutional capacity, and alignment with national priorities. The discussion reveals that although Kenya's diplomatic engagements have expanded in access to multilateral and bilateral funding and influenced national climate finance systems, these successes are mediated by institutional fragmentation, competing bureaucratic mandates, and asymmetric donor-recipient power relations. Consequently, this has resulted in a disparity in climate finance performance in terms of sector and governance level performance, with localized successes coexisting alongside coordination failures and limited distributive equity. The article argues that technocratic models of climate finance coordination ignore the competing interests and power struggles over who controls the resources and who benefits from them. This paper recommends that Kenya, through climate change diplomacy, should prioritize securing grant-based and devolved climate finance and enhanced transparent national-county coordination mechanisms, to ensure that climate finance has a meaningful impact on the most vulnerable and climate-affected populations. The study moves beyond formal policy evaluation to demonstrate how political economy dynamics shape the real effectiveness of climate finance, offering a nuanced account of country ownership as a negotiated and contested process rather than a technical design outcome.

**Key Words**: Climate Change Diplomacy, Climate Finance, Climate Governance, Kenya, Political Economy, Rational Actor Model

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

## I. INTRODUCTION

Kenya provides a compelling case for understanding the effectiveness of climate financing through climate change diplomacy because it combines high vulnerability to climate change with proactive international engagement. Kenya has actively engaged global climate regimes through participating in the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement, and making climate action a part of its overall development agenda. Climate change has also been firmly anchored within Kenya's foreign policy framework. Kenya has also used these international regimes to access financial and technical resources to support the agroforestry and growth of green energy, land restoration, afforestation, and the mobilization of domestic resources towards mitigation, resilience, and adaptation (Kipkemboi et al., 2024). This is driven by the fact that Kenya is extremely susceptible to climate change, with frequent droughts, floods, and loss of livelihoods (Lutta et al., 2025). The response to these impacts needs significant and predictable domestic, bilateral, and multilateral climate finance.

Climate finance flows to the Global South have grown in the past twenty years. In response to this, Kenya has established a comprehensive legal and institutional framework to organize these resources, such as the National Climate Change Council and the National Climate Change Fund (Omala et al., 2024). In addition, Kenya has also engaged with multilateral funds like the Green Climate Fund and the Climate Investment Funds and a wider global architecture of climate finance. The global climate finance is highly fragmented and dispersed across over 90 funds and a wide range of implementing actors (Skovgaard et al., 2023). However, Tamasiga et al. (2023) note that climate finance is limited by the small volumes when compared to the demands, low rates of adaptation disbursements in Africa, and the use of loans instead of grants (Savvidou et al., 2021). In Kenya, persistent underfunding of domestic climate initiatives highlights the continued reliance on foreign funding and reveals gaps in national ownership, policy coherence, and coordination across climate governance institutions (Kipkemboi et al., 2024). Given its combination of active climate diplomacy, relatively advanced institutional frameworks, and persistent financing and coordination gaps, Kenya provides an instructive case for examining climate finance effectiveness in African and lower-middle-income countries facing similar structural and governance constraints.

Despite Kenya's active climate diplomacy and the continuous evolution of its national climate frameworks, substantial uncertainty remains regarding the extent to which climate finance is effectively mobilized, coherently coordinated, and translated into equitable mitigation and adaptation outcomes. The dynamics of the political economy, conflicting interests, power relations, and competition over resources influence the climate finance coordination and often hinder the functioning of the key institutions, including the National Climate Change Council and Fund (Omala et al., 2024). The lack of coordination between national, county, and international actors, as well as inadequate and in most cases poorly-focused flows, is dangerous as they may increase the gaps in adaptation in vulnerable regions and communities (Nyambura, 2025). This paper thus evaluates the efficiency of climate financing using the Kenya climate change diplomacy, the degree to which international interactions and national governance structures have provided consistent, nation-owned, and effective climate action.

### 1.2 Research Objectives

#### 1.2.1 General Objective

To examine the extent to which Kenya's climate diplomacy has improved access to climate finance and the effectiveness of domestic coordination, governance, and equity of climate outcomes.

#### 1.2.2 Specific Objectives

i. To assess the extent to which Kenya's climate diplomacy has enhanced access to climate finance.
ii. To evaluate the effectiveness of domestic coordination and governance of climate finance flows in Kenya.
iii. To examine whether existing climate finance arrangements translate into equitable and measurable climate outcomes in Kenya.

## II. THEORETICAL REVIEW

The paper derives the definition of climate finance effectiveness as the scale to which financial resources mobilized to respond to Kenya's climate change diplomacy increase the national resource base, reinforce the governance arrangements, and achieve measurable mitigation and adaptation outcomes that meet Kenya's national development priorities (Odhengo et al., 2019). Effectiveness is perceived as a multidimensional and temporal construct, not only the short-term outcomes, i.e., efficiency of resource mobilization, access, and disbursement, but also the long-term results of strengthening institutions, resilience, and long-term low-carbon development outcomes of vulnerable populations. The current literature on climate finance governance emphasizes that the increased fragmented flows intersect with intricate domestic political economy and power dynamics, determining who to give access to resources and whose interests take precedence (Bracking & Leffel, 2021).

As a theoretical framework to examine these dynamics, this article applies the Rational Actor Model (RAM) developed by Graham T. Allison. The state is considered to be unitary, purposive in the sense that it determines the end-goals, scans alternatives, calculates costs and benefits, and selects the action that is most likely to maximize utility within the constraints in the RAM (Cattaneo, 2018). When applied to climate diplomacy, Kenya is considered to be a rational actor capable of developing climate finance and negotiation policies to support their fundamental goals of securing predictable finance, resilience, growth in a green manner, and political and economic stability. The rational choice views have been extensively applied in explaining the governmental process of constructing climate positions and international strategy choice on the basis of incentives, abatement costs, and domestic political influences (Grundig, 2013; Browne, 2022; Zepeda, 2023).

In this context, the activity of Kenya within the global climate finance architecture (like Green Climate Fund, bilateral funds) can be viewed through the prism of strategic reactions to the opportunities and limitations of a fragmented system that is mostly controlled by donors (Browne, 2022). Rational decisions are conditioned by anticipated rewards of various forums, the terms of loans and grants, and the possibility of bringing national control on resource allocation to the maximum. Nevertheless, studies in climate finance coordination and governance caution that formal rational arrangements often underestimate the power of informal performance, ideational influence, and multi-actor complexity, which may restrict the functionality of ostensibly optimal institutional arrangements (Li, 2017; Bracking & Leffel, 2021). This analysis organizes inquiry accordingly around the objectives, choices, and perceived choices of Kenya in climate diplomacy and finance using the RAM and applying political economy knowledge to ask questions about where real-world actions deviate from the ideal unitary state.

## III. METHODOLOGY

The research applies a qualitative method to evaluate the usefulness of climate finance in Kenya. The analysis integrates the systematic review of the peer-reviewed literature, policy documents, legal frameworks, and official government reports with secondary empirical data on the sector-specific case studies on mitigation, adaptation, and climate finance instruments. Some of the key sources are national climate strategies, institutional frameworks, multilateral fund arrangements, and published assessments of country climate change funds, green financial initiatives, and sectoral mitigation programs. The paper employs document analysis to follow the pathway of how the climate diplomacy of Kenya is reflected in domestic governance systems and financial transactions. The Rational Actor Model is used to evaluate the strategic positioning of Kenya in world climate finance, with political economy interpretations used to determine efforts to deviate between institutional design and coordination routines as found in reality. Such a methodological combination allows carrying out an integrated evaluation of resource mobilization, governance coherence, and short- and long-term climate outcomes.

## IV. FINDINGS & DISCUSSIONS

### 4.1 Findings

The results show that the climate diplomacy in Kenya (independent variable) has had a moderate positive effect on access to international climate finance, especially through multilateral and bilateral sources. There is evidence of the growth in inflows in favor of renewable energy expansion and some adaptation programs. Nevertheless, domestic coordination and governance systems are not uniform and national and county institutional fragmentation and capacity bases limit the optimal use of funds. The results are mixed regarding the dependent variable (equitable and measurable climate outcomes). Although the mitigation benefits of the energy sector are high, the outcomes of adaptation and community-level resilience are minimal and unequally distributed. This implies that despite the rational diplomacy of Kenya, mobilization of resources has improved but structural and institutional factors undermine the transfer of financial inflows into climatic and development-wide effects. Enhancing coordination systems and the implementation capacity of the subnational level is thus important in enhancing overall effectiveness.

#### 4.1.1 Kenya's Climate Change Diplomacy Architecture

The structure of Kenya in climate diplomacy demonstrates a strategic approach of maximising the gains of global climate regimes without compromising national development objectives aligned with the Rational Actor Model (RAM). RAM views the state as a unitary actor that tries to maximise the payoffs with limited constraints. In this perspective, the institutional and diplomatic decisions made in Kenya can be interpreted as a calculated policy to provide climate finance, technology, and political assistance, and leave policy space to economic transformation. While the Rational Actor Model conceptualizes the state as a unitary decision-making entity, in practice, Kenya's climate diplomacy is shaped by interactions with domestic non-state actors, including private sector actors, civil society organizations, and development partners, whose interests and capacities influence national bargaining positions. Within the RAM framework, these actors can be understood as inputs into the state's preference formation process, even though the model ultimately treats the state as the final strategic decision-maker in international negotiations.

Kenya is bound by the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement, and has made ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 30-32% by 2030, with a heavy emphasis on renewable energy, forest restoration, and climate-resilient development (Koasidis et al., 2022; Naeku, 2020). Such commitments are domesticated with the dense legal-policy framework which includes the National Climate Change Response Strategy (2010), National Environment Policy (2013), National Climate Change Action Plan (2013-2017; 2018-2022), the National Adaptation Plan 2015- 2030 and the Climate Change Act 2016 amended 2023 which establishes a National Climate Change Council and requires climate action to be mainstreamed into planning and budgeting. In terms of RAM, these commitments reflect the effort of Kenya to signal reliability to donors and investors, increase access to climate finance, and lower vulnerability that might cripple long-term growth (Dalla Longa & Van Der Zwaan, 2017). Kenya participates in various diplomatic arenas: UNFCCC COPs, where it pursues mitigation and adaptation priorities; climate finance forums, including the Green Climate Fund and Climate Investment Funds; or wider platforms on sustainability that connect the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda (Koasidis et al., 2022). Through the African Group of Negotiators and the African Union, Kenya is operating regionally and is considered a pioneer in framing the climate-security nexus at the UN Security Council and other high-level fora (Iversen et al., 2024). Kenya has also sought spaces where the costs of participation and associated conditionalities do not outweigh the expected benefits, such as access to finance, technology, and agenda-setting influence - and has strategically leveraged its reputation as a reform-oriented, climate-vulnerable state to its advantage (Naess et al., 2015). Nevertheless, political economy literature emphasises how such rationality can be biased by domestic interests and power relations, such as favouritism towards sectors or projects that benefit elite economic interests at the cost of the most climate-vulnerable communities (Renner, 2020; Newell et al., 2018).

North-South collaboration has continued to play a central role in the climate agenda in Kenya with bilateral aid, multilateral funds, and technology cooperation. Climate readiness reforms, such as national climate finance policy and specific institutions, are also meant to make Kenya a believable partner to absorb and coordinate these flows (Kiremu et al., 2022). However, the coordination with big multilateral funds has often been regarded as a technical problem, obscuring the existence of divergencies of priorities between the donor and government, as well as limiting the applicability of finance in practice (Dzebo et al., 2020). Meanwhile, South-South cooperation is becoming more significant. Kenya works together with other African and Global South nations on joint standpoints in climate talks, on climate intelligent agriculture, and on energy and adaptation policies and initiatives, and assists to amplify Southern requests of equity, loss and damage funds and development compatible mitigation (Iversen et al., 2024). The given alliances may be viewed by using the RAM as the means of attaining bargaining power in relation to the Northern partners, sharing the technical skills and diversity of the sources of assistance, including those of new economies. On the domestic level, Kenyan architecture includes the National Climate Change Council, climate units within ministries, the climate finance position of the National Treasury, and devolved county arrangements (Mushitsi et al., 2023). Such a design is supposed to echo rational coordination to make international commitments effective and integrate them with Vision 2030. In reality, though, redundant mandates, sectoral fragmentation, lack of strong sub-national ability, and rivalry over institutions like the Council and National Climate Change Fund limit output and demoralize the transfer of diplomatic benefits into local resilience (Mbugua, 2025).

The difference between the idealised unitary rational actor of the RAM and the fractured, interest-based governance structures of Kenya is thus central to understanding the effectiveness of its climate diplomacy architecture. The formal commitments and multi-level engagements of Kenya are seen to be characterized by a clear strategic intent, yet this effect of their actions is ultimately determined by how the domestic politics, power asymmetries between the North and the South, and South-South coalitions redefine the allegedly rational decisions in practice (Skovgaard et al., 2023; Newell et al., 2018).

**4.1.2 Climate Finance Flows and Instruments Relevant to Kenya**

Kenya has a broad range of global climate finance resources. Resources are directed to accredited national bodies and multilateral development banks through multilateral climate funds in Kenya, including Green Climate Fund (GCF) and Climate Investment Funds (CIF), which are frequently in the form of project- or programme-based funding in line with Kenya's NDC and national plans (Skovgaard et al., 2023; Savvidou et al., 2021). These flows are overlapping with official development assistance (ODA) and other development finance, and provide coordination challenges, as well as prospects to align climate and development goals (Dzebo et al., 2020). Mitigation and adaptation efforts are funded by bilateral partners, for example, European development agencies (UK, Denmark) through grants and concessional loans, national vehicles have been capitalized through Kenya Climate Venture (Mungai, 2021), or sector programmes and county-level activities are supported (Orindi et al., 2017). Market mechanisms have been involved to a smaller yet significant extent. The Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) had renewable energy and land use projects in Kenya, but the scale was relatively small. Within the framework of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, there is a new possibility of connecting revenues of the carbon markets with national and regional programmes, as recommended more broadly in Africa, of using market-based solutions to mobilize private resources and control risks and ownership of countries (Michaelowa et al., 2020).

Humanitarian-related finance is also becoming more appropriate, particularly in arid and semi-arid countries. In response to drought and flood crises, humanitarian actors draw on short-term emergency budgets, yet it is increasingly advocated to implement climate financing and green technology in humanitarian responses as a substitute for reactive support and green investments of building resilience in northern Kenya (Nyambura, 2025). A relatively elaborate national climate finance architecture has also been developed in Kenya. The Climate Change Act 2016 amended 2023 creates a Climate Change Council and offers a Climate Change Fund as a national financing instrument of priority mitigation and adaptation measures, including grants and loans to public, private, and civil society actors and technical assistance to counties (Skovgaard et al., 2023; Naeku, 2020). he National Policy on Climate Finance approaches the idea of coordination, tracking, and mobilisation of climate finance through government and other partners, focusing on transparency and alignment with national priorities. The National Green Finance Strategy will help to ensure that environmental risk is incorporated into financial decision-making, that it advances green banking principles, and that it increases green financial instruments like green bonds and sustainable lending (Otieno, 2024). In 2019, Kenya became the first country to issue a corporate green bond, a move that indicated interest in the private sector, and the country is now established as a green finance hub in the region (Sabare, 2022; Ngwenya & Simatele, 2020).

#### 4.1.3 Coordination, Governance, and Country Ownership

Kenya's Foreign Policy of 2014) and the revised Kenya Foreign Policy of 2024 both deeply embed environmental protection and climate change as core pillars of the country's external engagement. These pillars have anchored Kenya's climate change diplomacy, providing a strategic framework through which the country advances international cooperation, advocates for climate justice, and pursues access to climate finance to support mitigation, adaptation, and resilience-building efforts. The Kenyan climate governance architecture formally designates climate finance and policy coordination to a combination of core institutions, with coordination and country ownership heavily conditioned by power relations and competing ideologies and not necessarily by technical design alone (Shawoo et al., 2022). At the national level, the National Treasury plays the leading role in the coordination of climate finance, serving as a National Designated Authority on the Green Climate Fund (Skovgaard et al., 2023). It leads or convenes coordination forums that integrate line ministries, development partners, and non-state actors, and manages the incorporation of climate finance into the public financial management (Dzebo et al., 2020).

The Ministry in charge of environment and climate change, and other agencies like the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA), safeguards, and project approval are primarily in charge of environment-related mandates (Omala et al., 2024). The National Climate Change Council, established within the framework of the Climate Change Act 2016 Amended 2023, is supposed to support the high level of cross-government coordination and strategic direction. Also, the suggested National Climate Change Fund can be seen as the national vehicle to pool and direct resources (Naeku, 2020). Devolution is centralized at the sub-national level, with the county governments in charge. Counties are anticipated to integrate climate change into County Integrated Development Plans, establish county climate change units and, in some instances, county climate funds, and organize local actors and projects (Ojwang et al., 2017). Multi-level governance literature points to new non-formal platforms between national ministries, counties, and civil society around adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and land restoration that partially overcome poor formal coordination systems (Mbugua, 2025). Even with this large architecture, there are coordination challenges, which persist. Empirical evidence from Kenya points to a disjointed climate finance environment, where various ministries, funds, and donors have overlapping mandates and share little information (Naeku, 2020). Duplication and gaps are caused by contentious boundaries on who is to lead and how decisions are made between the National Treasury, the environment ministries, and emerging coordination bodies (Skovgaard et al., 2023).

The operationalization of the National Climate Change Council and the National Climate Change Fund is one of the most politicised topics where there is an agreement conflict regarding the composition, resource allocation, and responsibility (Omala et al., 2024). Inefficiency in the implementation and coordination of climate actions is caused by weak linkages between national finance mechanisms and county treasuries, capacity limitations, and lack of consistency in legal frameworks at the county level (Mbugua, 2025). The most important realisation is that the concept of coordination is often presented as a technical practice that primarily revolves around procedures, reporting, and alignment, and makes invisible the underlying political differences between actors (Skovgaard et al., 2023). Globally as well as in Kenya, the major funds (GCF, CIF) have preferred coordination between like-minded institutions, whereas controversial issues like power distribution, priorities, and risk have remained off the table, which detracts from the benefits of overcoming fragmentation. The documents of the national policy also describe coordination as a neutral management of stakeholders despite the fact that it is the place of contestation (Omala et al., 2024). Tension between donors and the government hinders coordination. In Kenya, much climate finance flows through bilateral channels with agendas that often diverge from the government's, reducing state engagement and motivation for coordination (Dzebo et al., 2020). Development partners themselves dispute leadership roles, pulling in different directions and intensifying institutional conflicts (Shawoo et al., 2022). According to Omala et al. (2024), interests, incentives, power relations, and ideological framings play a decisive role in determining both coordination and country ownership. Higher-budgeted ministries and those more closely connected to donors, especially the National Treasury, exert disproportionate control over coordination structures and are able to direct them towards their desired narratives (for example, macro stability, bankable mitigation projects) (Skovgaard et al., 2023).

Clashing vested interests of access to climate finance and control of funds promote contestation among ministries, agencies, and counties. A problem of who is to be the chair of the coordination platform, who gives a green light to proposals, and who has access to the National Climate Change Fund, at its core, is a resource allocation problem and power problem (Omala et al., 2024). Also affecting the coordination are the existing power differences between the donors and the government; ownership presupposes a shift in power, yet most of the arrangements do not transfer core agenda-setting power to the foreign party, even in the case of national structures on paper (Newell et al., 2018). Framings of climate finance as an ideological resource-efficiency problem versus a distributive justice and development problem influence what constitutes legitimate coordination. Technocratic strategies downplay the question of who gains and who loses when particular coordination models are applied, and that particular actors and places are systematically advantaged by the access to climate funds in comparison to others (Newell et al., 2018). Similar critical analysis of climate-smart agriculture and collaboration with the private sector in Kenya demonstrates the influence of dominant framings and donor preferences to marginalise local knowledge, issues of equity, and the most vulnerable populations, despite the projects officially being country-owned (Gannon et al., 2021).

**4.1.4 Empirical Assessment of Effectiveness**

Stakeholder-based studies on the coordination system in Kenya reveal that the lack of effectiveness, according to the political economy factors, despite the elaborate legal and institutional frameworks, is due to the technical design. The definitions of the idea of effective coordination vary significantly among actors, influenced by ideologies (e.g., climate justice vs. growth first), incentives, and power relations (Omala et al., 2024). To some, effectiveness can be defined in terms of access to funds in a streamlined way and minimized duplication; others see it in terms of even distribution, transparency, and local involvement. These polarising frames are then translated into a disagreement of mandates and funds, particularly pertaining to the National Climate Change Council and the National Climate Change Fund, which is a highly politicized operationalization.

The comparative analysis between Kenya and Zambia demonstrates that the increase in formal country ownership does not necessarily result in more successful coordination. In Kenya, there is no effective national leadership on coordination and underlying differences in priorities and financial control between the National Treasury and the environment agencies and other ministries, hindering coherence and slowing down decision-making (Shawoo et al., 2022). The forums of coordination encourage actors to have common likings and depoliticise disputes, which makes invisible winners and losers and limits the ability of coordination to deal with fragmentation or allocation distortions (Lunsgaarde et al., 2021).

Adaptation and coastal governance assessments on the sub-national level demonstrate that national-level institutions and laws provide an enabling background but do not necessarily result in successful local action (Chaudhury et al., 2020). Human capacity, financial and climate data, and county governments have gaps limiting their human capacity to mainstream climate change into planning despite explicit requirements (Ojwang et al., 2017; Mbugua, 2025; Chaudhury et al., 2020). Where County Climate Change Funds (CCCFs) have been implemented, they have expedited the planning and execution of locally pertinent resilience initiatives, which implies that devolved, predictable money can enhance performance when supported by robust participation and capability (Chaudhury et al., 2020).

The literature on the effectiveness of particular climate finance instruments in Kenya is still scarce, but it is possible to identify several strands. An overview of nine types of climate finance policies across the world reveals that loan guarantees, national development banks, feed-in tariffs, and tax credits tend to be effective in mobilizing private capital, whereas national climate funds, targeted lending, disclosure policies, and green bonds are less effective or in mixed success (Bhandary et al., 2021). This has implications for Kenya, for example, the instruments to mobilise investment have been demonstrated to be broadly in line with the instruments used by the country to guarantee concessional loans and development finance in other sectors (renewable energy and dairy agriculture) (Bhandary et al., 2021; Odhong et al., 2019).

The empirical Kenya dairy Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA) experience indicates that only when instruments are well aligned with the constraints of the farmers and the financial sector, can profitable low emission practices become adoptable by scale (Odhong et al., 2019). Most dairy investments make economic sense on paper, but the smallholders are unable to repay commercial rate credit, and banks have capacity and risk constraints to lend to this market (Odhong et al., 2019). Climate finance can hence best be applied in concessional loan window capitalisation, credit-guarantee funds to distribute risk, and grants to help with technical advice and build capacity.

To ensure the viability and scalability of mitigation, a diversified, demand-responsive package that is specific to different farmers and value chain actors is needed. The National Green Finance Strategy by Kenya has started mobilising green investments and impacting financial institutions, but the first results are small and uneven (Otieno, 2024). An enabling discourse and partiality of the financial policy to the green ideals can witness progress in a mixed methods evaluation, but the regulatory void, low financial inclusion, and public awareness pose obstacles to wider adoption. As the regression findings indicate, the relationship between the financial and institutional variables and green investment patterns is strong, which implies that the enhancement of these builders could contribute to the mobilisation of great importance. Nevertheless, the research also indicates that green finance is yet to be entirely embedded in business models of financial institutions, making a transformative impact constrained (Otieno, 2024).

On a project basis, a keen economic evaluation of the development of irrigation in Mwea indicates that climate-motivated popular investment can be a successful adaptation mechanism that can convert the anticipated climate-induced losses of revenue to the farm households as net gains by 2050 (Narita et al., 2020). The results of the study, by reducing climate scenarios and aligning them to the hydrology, crop yields, and household income, show that with median climate scenarios, without the project, income losses to the tune of 6% are turned to positive effects with irrigation (Narita et al., 2020). This shows that properly engineered, climate-screened infrastructure can provide quantifiable resilience benefits to offer a sound foundation on which to base adaptation finance allocation.

In addition to mobilisation and coordination, the ultimate measure of effectiveness depends on whether climate finance will cut down emissions, create resilience, and development. At the macro level, Kenya-specific econometric evidence is yet to be realized. Investment inflows, renewable energy share, employment, and greenhouse gas emissions are evaluated as possible correlates of the National Green Finance Strategy, with the results of the model suggesting that economic and energy variables have a high dependence on the trends in emissions (Otieno, 2024). Nevertheless, the small size of the sample and the preliminary character of the given work imply that the conclusions concerning the causal influence are only preliminary. On a broader level, cross-country literature demonstrates that with the combination of green finance and effective governance frameworks, renewable energy investment can substantially decrease $CO_2$ emissions, but non-linear relationships also arise depending on the thresholds of policies (Yadav et al., 2024). Although this discussion is specific to BRICS economies, it supports the Kenyan data that the quality of governance is core to the conversion of green finance and investment into environmental benefits (Lubinga & Mazenda, 2024; Yadav et al., 2024).

Kenya's experience with CCCFs and county-level resilience projects in the context of adaptation leads to positive but still local results. According to the case work, CCCFs have the potential to speed up mainstreaming of adaptation within county plans, facilitate community prioritised community good (e.g., water infrastructure, rangeland management), and empower local institutions with early signs of increased resilience to drought and climate shocks (Chaudhury et al., 2020). However, it is only covered in a few counties, and there are limited long-term outcome data available.

Assessments of coastal governance also discover that the current institutional frameworks and integrated policies of coastal management offer a context of adaptation, and the lack of human capacity, access to finances, and information at the county level are the reasons to take minimal action (Ojwang et al., 2017). This implies that readiness of climate finance at the national level and legal reforms, though needed, are not adequate to achieve resilient results on the ground, without long-term support of sub-national implementation. Empirical findings concerning the stakeholder views on co-governance of climate and sustainability show an overall discrepancy between policy discourses and the perceived development (Koasidis et al., 2022). Along with the modern energy access, agriculture, biodiversity, and life on the land, the stakeholders in Kenya have consistently focused on issues that are evident but are experiencing a continuous disparity in cross-sector policies and coordination, despite the numerous strategies and plans. This gap suggests that the effectiveness of climate-related finance and governance is constrained not only by a lack of policy documents but also by the implementation capacity, target consistency, and manageability of trade-offs and synergies (Koasidis et al., 2022; Chaudhury et al., 2020).

### 4.2 Discussion

Kenya's climate diplomacy has elevated its international profile, but its domestic effectiveness remains uneven. The active climate diplomacy has assisted Kenya in emerging as a climate leader in Africa, as well as winning major international attention and funding. Nevertheless, the transfer of this diplomatic profile into functional access to finance, cohesive coordination, and strong on-the-ground performance is partial and uneven, limited by the politics of the domestic economy and the structure of global climate finance (Kiremu et al., 2022)

Kenya's institutional preparedness has strengthened its access to international climate finance. Kenya is often mentioned as being comparatively progressive when it comes to climate policies, institutional preparedness, and involvement with multilateral funds internationally (Lutta et al., 2025; Adom et al., 2024). The climate finance preparedness is evidenced by a wide range of legal and policy frameworks, an official National Treasury focal point, and a National Green Finance Strategy, which directly connects domestic reforms with Paris Agreement commitments (Kiremu et al., 2022). This has helped to achieve relatively good access to climate finance in the African environment, such as multilateral climate funds and bilateral partners, and leadership in sustainable financial tools such as green bonds and green finance strategies (Sabare, 2022).

Diplomatic success has not closed the gap between climate finance needs and actual flows. Kenyan and African experience demonstrates that the gap between needs and flows has not been narrowed by the success of diplomacy. Adaptation-associated finance to Africa was, on average, less than US$5.5 billion per year at the continental scale in 2014-2018, which is much less than forecasted adaptation expenses and mainly concentrated on loans and a few sectors (Savvidou et al., 2021). The ratio of disbursement on adaptation (46%) is far less than that on the general development finance (96%), which is indicative of systemic impediments in the form of commitments and implementation (Savvidou et al., 2021). Surveys that concentrate on the post-COVID investment outlook in Kenya also refer to the falling or redistributed financing of climate and demand fresh frameworks to mobilise external and domestic funds (Nhamo & Chapungu, 2024).

Reliance on external finance remains a structural vulnerability within Kenya's climate strategy. Climate diplomacy has actually assisted in attracting external resources and technical assistance within Kenya, but excess reliance on external funding is a structural weakness. A climate regime evaluation of Kenya reveals that despite the international conventions allowing afforestation, green power, and resource mobilisation, the nation still relies on external funding to achieve the mitigation and adaptation targets (Kipkemboi et al., 2024). Arid and semi-arid counties also have inadequate humanitarian and adaptation and resilience agendas, and even in the latter, adaptation, which constitutes approximately 20-25% of the public funds, fails to reach vulnerable populations (Nyambura, 2025). Diplomacy has therefore created openings but has not been translated into finance of the magnitude and kind (grants, concessional terms, local access) needed to bring about transformative adaptation and low-carbon development.

Diplomatic engagement has significantly shaped Kenya's domestic coordination framework. The diplomatic policy of Kenya has obviously informed its domestic coordination framework: the creation of a National Policy on Climate Finance, a Climate Change Act, and suggested national climate funds are all in line with international standards related to country ownership and coordinated access to multilateral finance (Kipkemboi et al., 2024). The comparative analysis of Kenya and Zambia indicates that even the superior level of formal ownership in the country and the advanced policy framework of Kenya are the result of the active participation in global aid and climate finance agendas.

Formal ownership and legal sophistication have not automatically translated into effective coordination. Empirical studies show that an increased level of country ownership and highly developed legal regimes have not necessarily led to effective coordination. Based on political economy considerations, competing interests, power imbalances, and conflicting ways of framing climate finance, there are strong conditions that, in fact, lead to coordination (Omala et al., 2024). The National Treasury, environmental agencies, and the new climate councils are competing to have control over climate funds, and donors vary in the preferred institution to collaborate with (Shawoo et al., 2022). The concept of coordination is often presented in technical, apolitical terms, according to the discourses of global governance, depoliticising disagreement and losing sight of winners and losers.

There is a mismatch between international coordination narratives and domestic political realities. Official accounts of diplomatic countries led, well-coordinated climate finance, therefore, are ill-fitting domestic realities of fragmentation, overlapping mandates, and poor vertical linkages between national and country (Renner, 2020). Efficiency and procedural harmonization are also the organizing principles of multilateral funds, including the Green Climate Fund and Climate Investment Funds, which mostly shun more substantive political differences inside and between recipient states (Skovgaard et al., 2023). In the case of Kenya, this implies that diplomacy has worked well in institutionalising the global standards of coordination, but not so well in prompting the political compromises and power rebalancing that would be needed to have a truly working, legitimate coordination.

Evidence of effectiveness is visible in specific projects, but not yet systemic. Outcome evidence demonstrates areas of success, such as the successful implementation of climate finance in irrigation projects, green finance programs, and county adaptation funds, but not an organisation-wide, systematic transfer of diplomatic power into transformative climate and development outcomes (Odhong et al., 2019). The National Green Finance Strategy in Kenya has initiated the mobilisation of investment and to change financial practices in accordance with global green finance discussions, but the regulatory gaps, poor financial inclusion, and public awareness are limiting its effectiveness. Locally relevant resilience and private sector adaptation activities have been assisted by County Climate Change Funds and multi-stakeholder partnerships, which are limited in both geography and funding, often requiring donor momentum (Gannon et al., 2021).

Kenya's experience mirrors broader continental challenges in climate finance. These trends reflect the trends found in Africa on the whole: volumes of adaptation finance are inadequate, misaligned, and slow to pay out; loans take the place of grants; local-level effects are not sufficiently quantified (Lutta et al., 2025). According to quantitative research on global studies, climate finance will help decrease emissions and promote green growth, especially in cases when domestic institutions are more powerful (Lee et al., 2022). Nevertheless, these results are highly contextual and fail to explain within-country distributional problems. In Africa, bureaucratic hurdles, unequal distribution, and non-transparency remain the main obstacles towards the translation of international commitments into change on the ground (Adom et al., 2024).

A central tension persists between international recognition and domestic political economy realities. The conflict between foreign representations and national political economy is a theme that is repeated in Kenya and Africa. On the external level, Kenya is presented as a successful African climate actor: ambitious NDCs, developed policy frameworks, innovative green bonds, and proactive diplomacy (Sabare, 2022). Climate finance discussions at the international level focus on the ownership of countries, collaboration, and mutual benefits (Adisa et al., 2024). Domestically, climate finance is commonly marginalised in comparison to growth and extractive agendas; political elites have been concerned with short-term economic projects potentially at the expense of climate goals, whereas climate institutions grapple with underfunding and low political prominence (Renner, 2020).

Africa-wide evidence further reinforces the persistence of structural finance constraints. Similar contradictions emerge in Africa-wide analyses of climate finance mechanisms and funding dynamics, where the formal architecture has become increasingly complex. However, in practice, it is still influenced by debt burdens, unsupportive policy frameworks, restricted involvement of the private sector, and conflicting priorities (Adisa et al., 2024). These dynamics are relevant to explain why Kenya, despite its institutional preparedness and diplomatic influence, continues to experience fragmented finance landscapes, underfunded adaptation, and long-term implementation gaps (Nhamo & Chapungu, 2024).

Kenya's case reflects both distinctive strengths and common continental patterns. The situation in Kenya is generally in line with the comparative African and global evidence on the effectiveness of climate finance, although there are some specifics. Compared to numerous African counterparts, Kenya possesses more powerful policy frameworks, a more diversified climate financing toolkit, and an observable presence in the international negotiation process, which have made it easier to access and experiment with climate finance (Sabare, 2022). Meanwhile, its difficulties, disjointed coordination, dependence on external flows, unequal access to the city, technocratic depoliticization, and so on, are typical of broader continental trends (Adom et al., 2024).

The effectiveness of climate finance depends on domestic governance quality and inclusiveness. The body of work in econometrics all over the world reveals that climate financing has the potential to add to the reduction in emissions, particularly mitigation-oriented flows with higher economies and institutions in the countries (Lee et al., 2022). Kenya meets some of these conditions and indicates the possibility of positive effects; however, specific mapping of the African continent shows that adaptation financing to the continent falls short and is disbursed in a chaotic manner, and does not imply large-scale resilience benefits. Continental reviews highlight that, unless it is accompanied by more robust domestic governance, inclusive making and capturing of local needs, international climate finance mechanisms will reinforce existing inequalities and vulnerabilities (Lutta et al., 2025).

## V. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

### 5.1 Conclusion

The evaluation of climate financing based on the climate diplomacy in Kenya depicts a mixed picture, but it is somewhat improving. The use of diplomatic interaction has been vital to increase the volume and variety of climate finance, make Kenya a regional leader on green investment, and incorporate the issue of climate in national planning. There has been increased access to multilateral funds that are major and institutionalized coordination and devolution systems. Nevertheless, persistent challenges, including fragmented governance, skewed national ownership, weak transparency, and misalignment between external discourse and the domestic political economy, continue to constrain the transformative potential of these resources.

Greater effectiveness has been achieved where Kenya has aligned clear national priorities with strong domestic institutions and strategically deployed diplomatic capital to shape the terms of engagement, rather than adopting a passive, donor-compliant posture. On the other hand, fiscal sustainability and the increasing centre-periphery inequalities have been fed in some cases by overdependence on projectized, externally driven finance and debt-based instruments. Empirical evidence indicates that climate diplomacy becomes most effective in instances where it has strong domestic coalitions, strengthened sub-national governments, and inclusive inclusion of communities that are mostly exposed to climate risks.

Further research could explore the longitudinal impact of climate finance on local resilience outcomes and examine how innovative financing instruments, including blended finance and South-South cooperation, can be scaled to achieve equitable, sustainable, and nationally owned climate action. Policymakers should prioritize strengthening domestic institutions, improving transparency, and aligning international finance with sub-national and community priorities to fully realize the transformative potential of climate diplomacy.

### 5.2 Recommendations

The experience of climate finance in Kenya highlights the importance of reforms that require more than technocratic solutions to reform the underlying interests and power imbalances in politics. The Ministry of Environment, in close coordination with line ministries, should have the National Treasury take a lead by introducing climate finance into its Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and Public Finance Management (PFM) systems. Negotiating financing arrangements with development partners should be the main responsibility of the National Treasury in order to maintain fiscal space and limit over-reliance on debt instruments. This will involve better prioritization of national priorities, enhanced incorporation of climate finance into the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework and Public Finance Management systems, and active bargaining of conditions with development partners in order to preserve fiscal space and policy independence.

Operationalisation of the National Climate Change Fund should be overseen by the environment and the National Climate Change Council, with budgetary alignment and fiscal oversight being ensured by the National Treasury. The National Climate Change Fund and associated instruments must be funded by a combination of domestic budgetary investments, earmarked levies, green bonds, and international donations to be on-budget, with specific rules on additionality and concessionality. A more explicit statutory role and more technical capability of the Climate Change

Council to screen projects, coordinate sectoral pipelines, and spearhead programmatic negotiations with large multilateral sources like the GCF and CIF should be given. Open project selection criteria, uniform MRV (measurement, reporting, and verification) regulations, and web-based data portals on allocations and disbursements would assist in curbing fragmentation and projectization by donors and increase trust among the domestic community and the international community.

The community and county-level involvement should be further engaged, as this is a key to effectiveness and justice. County governments, supported by the National Treasury and the Ministry of Devolution, should receive predictable, formula-based transfers for climate action linked to County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs). Local government should be enabled by transferring funds predictably and capacity building to design and jointly fund locally led climate responses in line with the County Integrated Development Plans. Participatory priorities, social accountability, and context-specific resilience investments, particularly in arid and semi-arid lands, can be institutionalized with devolved climate finance mechanisms, including county climate change funds and ward-level planning committees. The Ministry of Environment can establish easy access modalities and guides that are suitable for sub-national organizations to cut across the administrative hurdles that exclude elite buy-ins.

On the diplomatic front, Kenya needs to more strategically diversify the source of finance besides ensuring that all the flows are geared towards a just transition agenda. Diplomatic activities in UNFCCC COPs, GCF Board discussions, and MDB discussions should be polarised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, working with the Ministry of Environment and the National Treasury. This is to ensure that grants and very generous adaptation and loss-and-damage finance become the priority. In North-South arenas (UNFCCC COPs, GCF Board, MDB negotiations), Kenya can use its reputation as a regional climate leader to campaign for scaled-up grants and extremely concessional finance of adaptation, loss and damage, and resist the temptation of over-reliance on debt-creating instruments.

Meanwhile, the climate diplomacy in Nairobi should express a sense of a national just transition plan that incorporates access to energy, jobs, industrialization, and social protection, and use it as a reference point to assess and direct incoming finance. The Just Transition Framework made by the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of Industrialization should be developed and published together and used to inform both domestic reform and external financing negotiations. It is possible to crowd-in resources to promote resilience, adaptation, and disaster risk reduction by proactively involving the activities of the private investors, philanthropies, and humanitarian actors, provided that the national standards regarding equity, environmental integrity, and debt sustainability are met. The National Treasury should establish clear screening criteria to ensure that private and blended finance instruments align with debt sustainability and equity safeguards.

**Declaration of Interest**

The authors declare that they do not have any known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

**Funding Declaration**

This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

## REFERENCES

Adisa, O., Ilugbusi, B. S., Obi, O. C., Awonuga, K. F., Adelekan, O. A., Asuzu, O. F., & Ndubuisi, N. L. (2024). International climate finance mechanisms: A review with focus on Africa. *International Journal of Science and Research Archive, 11*(1), 2365–2375. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2024.11.1.0146

Adom, R. K., Mukoki, P., Ngwenya, N., & Simatele, M. D. (2024). Exploring the complications of climate change funding in Sub-Saharan African countries. *Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 29*(6), 58. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-024-10155-z

Bhandary, R. R., Gallagher, K. S., & Zhang, F. (2021). Climate finance policy in practice: A review of the evidence. *Climate Policy, 21*(4), 529–545. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2020.1871313

Bracking, S., & Leffel, B. (2021). Climate finance governance: Fit for purpose? *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 12*(4), e709. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.709

Browne, K. E. (2022). Rethinking governance in international climate finance: Structural change and alternative approaches. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 13*(5), e795. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.795

Cattaneo, K. H. (2018). Applying policy theories to charter school legislation in New York: Rational actor model, stage heuristics, and multiple streams. *Educational Policy Analysis and Strategic Research, 13*(2), 6–24.

Chaudhury, M., Summerlin, T., & Ginoya, N. (2020). *Mainstreaming climate change adaptation in Kenya: Lessons from Makueni and Wajir Counties.* World Resources Institute. https://doi.org/10.46830/wriwp.19.00086

Dalla Longa, F., & Van der Zwaan, B. (2017). Do Kenya's climate change mitigation ambitions necessitate large-scale renewable energy deployment and dedicated low-carbon energy policy? *Renewable Energy, 113*, 1559–1568. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2017.06.026

Dzebo, A., Shawoo, Z., & Kwamboka, E. (2020). *Coordinating climate finance in Kenya: Technical measures or political change?* Stockholm Environment Institute.

Gannon, K. E., Crick, F., Atela, J., & Conway, D. (2021). What role for multi-stakeholder partnerships in adaptation to climate change? Experiences from private sector adaptation in Kenya. *Climate Risk Management, 32*, 100319. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2021.100319

Grundig, F. (2013). Political strategy and climate policy: A rational choice perspective. In *Climate change and political strategy* (pp. 89–106). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644010903157057

Iversen, T. O., Brox Brodtkorb, I., Ali, A., & Koefoed, M. (2024). Trailblazers in a warming world? The agency of African actors in climate, peace, and security. *African Security, 17*(3–4), 251–276. https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2024.2433889

Kipkemboi, C. P., Lawrence, A. M., Omuse, O. D., & Kipkorir, K. W. (2024). Successes and pitfalls of global climate regimes in Kenya: Insights on Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement. https://doi.org/10.51244/ijrsi.2024.1110032

Kiremu, M., Scrimgeour, F., Mutegi, J., & Mumo, R. (2022). Climate finance readiness: A review of institutional frameworks and policies in Kenya. *Sustainable Environment, 8*(1), 2022569. https://doi.org/10.1080/27658511.2021.2022569

Koasidis, K., Nikas, A., Karamaneas, A., Saulo, M., Tsipouridis, I., Campagnolo, L., ... & Doukas, H. (2022). Climate and sustainability co-governance in Kenya: A multi-criteria analysis of stakeholders' perceptions and consensus. *Energy for Sustainable Development, 68*, 457–471. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esd.2022.05.003

Lee, C. C., Li, X., Yu, C. H., & Zhao, J. (2022). The contribution of climate finance toward environmental sustainability: New global evidence. *Energy Economics, 111*, 106072. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2022.106072

Li, F. (2017). Actors behaving badly: Exploring the modelling of non-optimal behaviour in energy transitions. *Energy Strategy Reviews, 15*, 57–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2017.01.002

Lubinga, M. H., & Mazenda, A. (2024). Empirical analysis of the effect of institutional governance indicators on climate financing. *Economies, 12*(2), 29. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies12020029

Lunsgaarde, E., Adams, K., Dupuy, K., Dzebo, A., Funder, M., Fejerskov, A., Shawoo, Z., & Skovgaard, J. (2021). *The politics of climate finance coordination: Enhancing aid effectiveness.* https://doi.org/10.51414/sei2021.022

Lutta, A., Kehbila, A., Kisang, O., Osano, P., & Macharia, P. (2025). *Climate finance landscape in arid and semi-arid counties of Kenya.* Stockholm Environment Institute. https://doi.org/10.51414/sei2025.054

Mbugua, J. (2025). Implementation challenges of Kenya's Climate Change Act (2016) at the urban county level: Case studies from counties in Kenya. *African Journal of Climate Change and Resource Sustainability.* https://doi.org/10.37284/ajccrs.4.1.3108

Michaelowa, A., Hoch, S., Weber, A., Kassaye, R., & Hailu, T. (2020). Mobilising private climate finance for sustainable energy access and climate change mitigation in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Climate Policy, 21*, 47–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2020.1796568

Mungai, E. M. (2021). Climate financing: Case study of Kenya Climate Venture Ltd. *Emerald Emerging Markets Case Studies.* https://doi.org/10.1108/EEMCS-09-2020-0355

Mushitsi, P., San, N. M., & Nsabimana, A. S. (2023). Climate change in Kenya: Understanding major threats and government policies for resilience. *International Journal of Environment and Climate Change, 13*(11), 3741–3754. https://doi.org/10.9734/ijecc/2023/v13i113554

Naeku, M. J. (2020). Climate change governance: An analysis of the climate change legal regime in Kenya. *Environmental Law Review, 22*(3), 170–183. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461452920958398

Naess, L. O., Newell, P., Newsham, A., Phillips, J., Quan, J., & Tanner, T. (2015). Climate policy meets national development contexts: Insights from Kenya and Mozambique. *Global Environmental Change, 35*, 534–544. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.08.015

Narita, D., Sato, I., Ogawada, D., & Matsumura, A. (2020). Integrating economic measures of adaptation effectiveness into climate change interventions: A case study of irrigation development in Mwea, Kenya. *PLoS ONE, 15*(12), e0243779. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0243779

Newell, P., Taylor, O., & Touni, C. (2018). Governing food and agriculture in a warming world. *Global Environmental Politics, 18*(2), 53–71. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00456

Ngwenya, N., & Simatele, M. D. (2020). Unbundling of the green bond market in the economic hubs of Africa: Case study of Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. *Development Southern Africa, 37*(6), 888–903. https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2020.1725446

Nhamo, G., & Chapungu, L. (2024). Prospects for a sustainable and climate-resilient African economy post-COVID-19. *Global Environmental Change, 86*, 102836. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102836

Nyambura, C. (2025). Humanitarian aid green technology innovations, climate financing and sustainable development in Kenya. *Journal of Financial and Management Sciences, 1*(1), 112–135. https://doi.org/10.70970/1hw3de19

Odhengo, P., Atela, J., Steele, P., Orindi, V., & Imbali, F. (2019). *Climate finance in Kenya: Review and future outlook.* Climate Finance Policy Brief, 1.

Odhong', C., Wilkes, A., Van Dijk, S., Vorlaufer, M., Ndonga, S., Sing'ora, B., & Kenyanito, L. (2019). Financing large-scale mitigation by smallholder farmers: What roles for public climate finance? *Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems, 3*, 3. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsufs.2019.00003

Ojwang, L., Rosendo, S., Celliers, L., Obura, D., Muiti, A., Kamula, J., & Mwangi, M. (2017). Assessment of coastal governance for climate change adaptation in Kenya. *Earth's Future, 5*(11), 1119–1132. https://doi.org/10.1002/2017EF000595

Omala, M. A., Kioko, E., & Gravesen, M. (2024). Effective climate finance coordination? Stakeholder perceptions, climate change policy implementation and the underlying political economy factors in Kenya. *Climate Policy, 24*(7), 863–877. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2024.2335914

Orindi, V., Elhadi, Y., & Hesse, C. (2017). Democratising climate finance at local levels. In *Building a climate resilient economy and society* (pp. 250–264). Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785368455.00028

Otieno, A. W. (2024). Evaluating the effectiveness of Kenya's National Green Finance Strategy in achieving sustainable economy and climate goals. *International Journal of Social Sciences, 11*(12), 8391–8400. https://doi.org/10.18535/ijsshi/v11i12.06

Renner, J. (2020). New power structures and shifted governance agendas disrupting climate change adaptation developments in Kenya and Uganda. *Sustainability, 12*(7), 2799. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12072799

Sabare, O. (2022). *Sustainable finance in Kenya: An overview of green bonds, low carbon development and ESG reporting.* https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4259067

Savvidou, G., Atteridge, A., Omari-Motsumi, K., & Trisos, C. H. (2021). Quantifying international public finance for climate change adaptation in Africa. *Climate Policy, 21*(8), 1020–1036. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2021.1978053

Shawoo, Z., Dzebo, A., Funder, M., & Dupuy, K. (2022). Country ownership in climate finance coordination: A comparative assessment of Kenya and Zambia. *Climate Policy, 22*(9–10), 1266–1280. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2022.2098227

Skovgaard, J., Adams, K. M., Dupuy, K., Dzebo, A., Funder, M., Fejerskov, A. M., & Shawoo, Z. (2023). Multilateral climate finance coordination: Politics and depoliticization in practice. *Global Environmental Politics, 23*(2), 125–147. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00703

Tamasiga, P., Molala, M., Bakwena, M., Nkoutchou, H., & Onyeaka, H. (2023). Is Africa left behind in the global climate finance architecture: Redefining climate vulnerability and revamping the climate finance landscape—A comprehensive review. *Sustainability, 15*(17), 13036. https://doi.org/10.3390/su151713036

Yadav, A., Gyamfi, B. A., Asongu, S. A., & Behera, D. K. (2024). The role of green finance and governance effectiveness in the impact of renewable energy investment on $CO_2$ emissions in BRICS economies. *Journal of Environmental Management, 358*, 120906. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2024.120906

Zepeda, C. A. T. (2023). The complexity of international climate cooperation. *InterAção, 14*(1), e74226. https://doi.org/10.5902/2357797574226