Key Challenges Facing AMISOM in Military Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa

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ABSTRACT

The world over, military diplomacy has not been always successful. This stems out of the fact that it could be faced by a plethora of challenges. This paper sets out to explore the key challenges facing AMISOM in military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa. The study adopted an exploratory and mixed methods research design. Data was obtained from a sample of 100 persons sampled from a population of 22,315 AMISOM Staff and Civilian contingent. The study employed a breadth of both primary and secondary sources for data collection. Primary data was being collected from study respondents by means of a research questionnaire and an interview schedule. The data analysis process involved both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Content analysis was mainly used to analyze the qualitative data and which would be reported normatively. Quantitative research findings were analyzed and reported using descriptive statistics, tables, graphs, charts and inferential statistics in Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS v23). Moreover, the data analysis was structured objectively to address each of the study research questions. The findings show that while competing interests may have clouded the scene at regional level, partly alluded to lack of a common approach to deal with the Somalia issue among the various countries, military diplomatic engagements by AMISOM are the most agreeable way to address regional peace and security. The study highlights the greater need for revised strategies in military diplomacy efforts and novel approaches to address competing interests among troop contributing countries that comprise AMISOM. Based on the study findings, the following recommendations were made. Arguably, the most important dimension of its success is hinged on the strategic unity and partnership of the different troops. At present however, the inconsistency in unity and strategic alliance among these countries continue to challenge the seamless command and probably influence the implementation of different military diplomacy strategies based on competing interests. Further, while assets remain a critical component of military diplomacy, the success of such multidimensional peace operations is equally anchored on a civilian component and the need for civilian capabilities. The realization of effective peacemaking and peacekeeping calls for efficient management structures at the field and in Addis for strategic and support of mission teams. AMISOM currently experiences an insufficient institutional capacity and human resources required to effectively handle complex peace operations and peacemaking initiatives. Recent assessment reveals the institution bureaucratic processes are still weak.

Key Words: Key Challenges Facing AMISOM; Military Diplomacy; Horn of Africa; Peace and Security
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM:	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU:	United Nations
IGAD:	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
KDF:	Kenya Defence Forces
SPSS:	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
TCCs:	Troop Contributing Countries
TFG:	Transitional Federal Government
UN:	African Union

I. INTRODUCTION

Military diplomacy is a relatively new concept given the shift in diplomacy over the last few decades contextualized not only within the broader aspect of a country's diplomatic practice that is enshrined within its foreign policy but also in the realm of defence diplomacy. Conceptually, it can be regarded as the set of activities carried out by state institutions whose aim is pursuit of the states' foreign policy interests in the realm of security and defence policy.[1] The actions in this case are based on diplomatic instruments and the use of negotiations. As such, military diplomacy is used in various functions including: information gathering and analysis on the security status quo and the armed forces of the receiving state, sending state representation and its armed forces in official ceremonies of the receiving country and sending state support of contracts forms arms and military equipment with the receiving country.[2]

Moreover, military diplomacy performs other basic functions of organizing working visits of defence authority representatives from the sender state and peaceful coexistence and stay of the military units in the receiving state, promoting mutual relations, communication and cooperation between the armed forces of the sender country and the receiving country.[3] It is for this purpose that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has undertaken various military diplomacy endevours aimed at enhancing peace and security in the country. These efforts have however been faced with numerous challenges.

The introduction of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia brought about a significant deterioration in the security situation in Somalia instead of bringing peace and stability. This situation caused by the government led to a new phase of warfare. In this context, AMISOM's biggest challenge was taking charge as a peacekeeping body when in real sense there was no peace to keep.

Due to volatility of the Somalia, AMISOM peacekeepers have often faced attacks by armed militia.[4] By 2008, the deadliest militia group was the youth militia Al-Shabaab that was approximately having 2000 youths who undertook the attack operations. These youths operated in groups of about 200-300 militias in each group.[5] This well-armed group attacked the AMISOM peacekeepers in a single attack and killed 11 Burundian peacekeepers, injuring 28 others in 2009. After investigations, it was noted that the insurgent attacks against AMISOM were well coordinated and were becoming more sophisticated and lethal. The ongoing conflict produced an escalating violence because it was mostly the TFG, AMISOM, and the Ethiopian forces that were responding to most of these attacks. This brought a collateral damage among the civilian population as the most people began to flee the city of Mogadishu. Approximately, 1.3 million people fled the city and this generated a feeling of anti-Ethiopian as well as an anti-American feeling.[6]

For the AMISOM, this kind of environment meant two main things. First, the security was to be highly pegged on the Ethiopian peacekeepers who were to do most of the work related to the security of Somalia. Second, AMISOM personnel had to face restriction in terms of their operations. This can be evident when AMISOM has restrictions on helping to protect the president and the prime minister of the TFG as well as to keep open the Airports and Seaports of Mogadishu. This was not an easy task for AMISOM because it meant that they have to security on the 4 Kilometer intersection that linked the presidential palace and the airport. These sites were the potential escape routes and were heavily guarded because the supplies in the country had to be maintained.[7] This among other challenges have complicated AMISOM's military diplomacy in Somalia. This study investigates the key challenges facing AMISOM in military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa.

1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

The world over, military diplomacy has not been always successful. This stems out of the fact that it could be faced by challenges such as the political atmosphere in host countries characterised by lack of sincerity to treaties among

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[1] Muthanna, K. A. "Military diplomacy." Journal of Defence Studies 5, no. 1 (2011): 1-15.

[2] Shea, Timothy C. *Transforming military diplomacy*. George C Marshall Centre Apo Ae 09053 European Centre for Security Studies, 2005.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Kromah, L. (2010). The role of AMISOM's civilian component. *conflict trends*, *2010*(2), 21-27.

[5] Rollins, J. (2010). *Al Qaeda and affiliates: historical perspective, global presence, and implications for US policy*. DIANE Publishing.

[6] Williams, P. D. (2009). Into the Mogadishu maelstrom: The African Union mission in Somalia. *International Peacekeeping*, *16*(4), 514-530.

[7] Dersso, S. A. (2010). Somalia dilemmas: changing security dynamics, but limited policy choices. *Institute for Security Studies Papers*, *2010*(218), 24.

warring factions largely constrains the peacekeeping efforts caused; [8] level sensitivity to their culture, religious beliefs and gender[9] that needs to be taken into consideration to avoid unwarranted hostile reactions; lack of sufficient financing, ill-preparedness,[10] poor equipment and insufficiency in troop strength among others. Though these among other challenges could limit the success of AMISOM in military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa, this is not well documented by existing literature. As a result, it remains a tall order making empirically informed recommendations on which challenges to tackle within the process of enhancing the efficacy of AMISOM's military diplomacy in the region. This study sets out to bridge the existing knowledge gaps by studying the key challenges facing AMISOM in military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa.

1.2 Research Objective
To explore the key challenges facing AMISOM in military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This section presents the theoretical literature as well as relevant literature on the study variable namely key challenges facing AMISOM in military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa.

2.1 Theoretical literature review
This study is anchored on theory of realism. According to Forde, the theory of realism is a school of thought that was founded by Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes that explain the relationship of power internationally.[11] This theory is centered on four propositions; first, proponents argue that states are the most important actors. Realists advance that states represent a key unit of analysis and when international relations are studied, it is these units that are being studied. Realists therefore use the interrelated parts of a system to represent the international system of a state.[12]

Secondly, it proposes that the international system is anarchic. According to realists, the presence or absence of a government largely defines the international political outcome. Whenever there is lack of a common rule making authority then, the international arena is considered self-help system. Each state is considered autonomous and is free to define its own power and interests. Anarchy therefore became the source of the overriding power that is shaping the interstate relations. Realists further argue that, since there is no authority that exists above the states, the condition of lawlessness of the international anarchy is the directive that makes the powerful states to dominate the weaker states.

Thirdly, realists propose that states pursue self-interests. According to them, the state is the principal actor of the international arena. In this case, most states are usually more concerned with their own security and in their acts, they tend to rely on their own national interests and struggle for power as opposed to the international struggle. Lastly, they propose that the principal concern of all the states is survival.[13] Since the realists see the states in the world as anarchical and view security as a central issue. To achieve the desired security, most of the states try and increase their power and engage in power comparison that in the end deter the possible aggressors. Wars are always fought to prevent the competing nations from improving into stronger nations with strong military force.[14]

From the above four propositions, realists view international relations as a struggle for power that is anchored on self-interest. They argue that since there is no central authority over the international society and the states tend to act independent and sovereign in terms of their own survival. Therefore, the objective of the national security is not reached because most state's security is not pegged on the international security.[15] The key issues that realists see, as dilemma is the security issue as most states define their own security and power. States are more inclined to acquiring more power in order to escape being subject to the power influence of other states. This theory therefore implies that,

[8] Ibid.

[9] Utley, Rachel E. Major Powers and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military Intervention. Routledge, 2017.

[10] Lamphear, John, ed. *African military history*. Routledge, 2017.

[11] Forde, S. (1995). International realism and the science of politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and neorealism. *International Studies Quarterly*, *39*(2), 141-160.

[12] Rossi, Enzo, and Matt Sleat. "Realism in normative political theory." *Philosophy Compass* 9, no. 10 (2014): 689-701.

[13] Sleat, Matt. "Realism, liberalism and non-ideal theory or, are there two ways to do realistic political theory?" *Political Studies* 64, no. 1 (2016): 27-41.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Haftendorn, H. (1991). The security puzzle: theory building and discipline building in international security. *International studies quarterly*, *35*(1), 3-17.

achieving national security becomes a problem because; the security of other states is threatened by the powerful states. Hence, when striving to achieve maximum security, new insecurities emerge between states thus leading to regional conflicts. Whenever a state is overwhelmed by non-actor states, an issue affects the entire region thus calling for intervention. The most common forms of interventions are military interventions, which can be in form of peacemaking, and peacekeeping. This theory is therefore relevant to this study because it does explain the rationale behind role of military diplomacy on peacekeeping and security in horn of Africa intervention in Somalia.

From the above theory, given that states are motivated by their national interests and preserve their autonomy, there is usually a clash of command in operations; some soldiers have to receive orders from their own country chain of command, which has often resulted in catastrophe following late response to attacks during operations. Moreover, this theoretical approach further explains the absence of a common intelligence gathering and sharing platform for AMISOM, most country troops running own platforms and the sharing of intelligence of information between troops is at bare minimum a success. Different country troops are aligned along different doctrines; Kenya uses the maneuver warfare doctrine of the US, Ethiopia uses the attrition doctrine of Russia, Uganda uses the maneuver doctrine of the UK while Tanzania uses a mixture of these doctrines signaling the lack of a common doctrine for AMISOM. Notably, states under AMISOM purchase their military hardware from different countries, Kenya purchases from US, Uganda from Russia and China, Ethiopia from Russia but all these are needed during the course of military operations. These elements underscore the high-level state centricity among troop contributing countries, which is agreeable under the theory of realism.

2.1 Challenges Facing Military Diplomacy

Military Diplomacy has been one the peacekeeping strategies of African Union, United Nations, IGAD, individual states and other state unions around the world. Whenever there arises a conflict/war in a member state or among states there is need to bring tranquility and harmony. For this reason, military power maybe involved to achieve this.[16] Amidst all this military machinery also face various challenges in their quest to enhance peace and security. Military personnel face hostile environment. The political atmosphere in host countries characterised by lack of sincerity to treaties among warring factions largely constrains the peacekeeping efforts caused. Recent scholarly evidence points to a wider opposition for military intervention within the African context, either independently or together with the opposing forces. In peacekeeping missions like Somalia and Sudan the UN and AU where military intervention was key, armed reaction has been witnessed either from the host nations and rebel groups.[17]

In the wake of political upheaval within the country and non-adherence to established treaties limit the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. Most African countries are characterised by high level sensitivity to their culture, religious beliefs and gender[18] and which peacekeepers need to take into account to avoid unwarranted hostile reactions. The arbitration over disputes calls for local leadership involvement, not to mention the certain restrictions that peacekeeping forces ought to pay attention to in the line of duty. Infringement of the cultural norms can be costly and in instances where this has been the case, individual peacekeepers have often been withdrawn or relocated from the peacekeeping mission in fear of the damaging reputation to peacekeepers. Such experiences have rightly prompted serious consideration among African peacekeeping militaries to include studies on host country culture and religious beliefs and that is now mandatory now for pre-deployment peacekeeping training among African military forces.[19]

The performance of African states in supporting pre-deployment preparation, sustainability and performance of their forces during peacekeeping operations in Africa is limited even in the UN and AU Peacekeeping operations. African peacekeeping contingents are often characterized by ill-preparedness and poor equipment among the forces as in the case of Sierra Leone, Sudan and the DR Congo that saw the insufficiency in troop strength and limited poor equipment.

Resultantly, most African missions have been widely considered as ineffective characterised by this ill preparedness of the peacekeepers.[20] While the United Nations and the AU require military contingents to be facilitated for at least three months in supplies and logistics before they can step in, most African peace keeping operations have

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[16] Shea, T. C. (2005). Transforming military diplomacy. George C Marshall Center Apo Ae 09053 European Center for Security Studies.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Utley, Rachel E. Major Powers and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military Intervention. Routledge, 2017.

[19] Onoja, Adoyi. "Peacekeeping challenges in Africa: The Darfur conflict." *conflict trends* 2008, no. 3 (2008): 39-44.

[20] Lamphear, John, ed. *African military history*. Routledge, 2017.

often been constrained by limited resources, contingent equipment often difficult to maintain given the lack of accessories and spare parts, and most states barely meet the mandatory rations and petroleum stores for self-sustenance of the three months before UN and AU takeover. The effectiveness and efficiency of African peacekeepers is thus a challenged ground, a notable case being the AU mission in Darfur where the operational efficiency of the troops before UN takeover was widely constrained by logistics difficulties.[21]

Peacekeeping operations often suffer the constraints insufficiently trained troops. Even in the presence of UN provides guidelines; most African militaries are insufficiently trained, ill prepared and equipped relative to the peacekeeping requirements and to handle the opposing forces.[22] In several missions have host regime and rebels been rated to be of higher in military capacity and equipment creating challenging the ability of peacekeepers to restore peace and stability. Further challenging their preparedness and capacity is the fact that most African economies are barely struggling sustain themselves and to procure basic military equipment and modern training aids leading to the utilization of only improvised aids coupled with poor logistics and lack of realistic approaches to training.[23] In the absence of well-articulated training, suitable logistics and relevant equipment, the training is never objective to realize the success of military diplomacy efforts. The case of DRC Congo suffices in this regard, where contingents were largely inefficient given absence of pre-deployment training on issues culture and language and equipment of both staff officers and observers.

Intelligence gathering and information sharing especially among troop contributing countries is essential for the success of peacekeeping operations, although the lack of a seamless intelligence sharing has often challenged coordination efforts within the mission. This is further worsened by the fact that different contingents employ different chains of command in information sharing thereby creating communication challenges for peacekeeping missions. With inferior technology during such operations, the fate of their operational efficiency and effectiveness is almost sealed.[24] In most instances, the borderline on the degree of force to employ remains unclear, a dilemma that has often confined peacekeepers to their bases in hostile situations and compelled them to adopt defensive mechanisms and await information flow from the chain of command despite situations demanding quick action to establish peace and calm.[25]

Different states ascribe to unique military doctrines, mainly defined by the respective former colonial powers and therefore undergo different training approaches. Doctrinal differences have had major impact on peacekeeping training undertaken by different contingents hence differences in the operating standard of militaries. While the UN training syllabus provide common guidelines, countries have remained at discretion to adopt conventional training practices although the dynamic methods employed by rebels have consistently challenged the effectiveness of peacekeeping efforts.[26] This largely accounts for the proactive or passive nature in the conduct of certain peacekeeping missions. Very few countries have the expertise and resources to carry effective peace operations training coupled by the fact that absence of qualified trainers translates to a dearth of requisite knowledge and skills necessary for success of peacekeeping operations.[27]

Delayed employment of military diplomacy as a peacekeeping mission strategy has become a predominant feature in the troubled states around world. This is because several operational and administrative logistics procedures have to be followed as prescribed by the affected state. These laydown procedures are common to peacekeepers and still exist. Resultantly, peacekeeping forces often are deployed for operations when it is late and not having undergone sufficient pre-deployment training not to mention the poor equipment and limited logistics during the launch of such missions.

In certain instances, the military equipment and capabilities of rebels have often been superior to those of peacekeepers with the latter consequently face operational difficulties. This may even give rise to fresh conflicts emerging.[28] Amidst the challenges, peacekeeping mission have been successful in most parts of the world. Therefore, it

[21] Piombo, Jessica, Koh Ernest, and Ann Igoe. "The Darfur Conflict" (2005).

[22] Squires, Chase. "New War Demands New Training for Troops." *Guardian Unlimited* (2006).

[23] Lamphear, John, ed. *African military history*. Routledge, 2017.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Collins, J. M., & Kingston, R. C. (2002). *Military strategy: Principles, practices, and historical perspectives*. Potomac Books, Inc.

[26] Schaab, Brooke B., and J. Douglas Dressel. *Training the troops: What today's soldiers tell us about training for information-age digital competency*. No. ARI-RR-1805. Army Research Inst for The Behavioural and Social Sciences Alexandria VA, 2003.

[27] Kaufman, K. R., Brodine, S., & Shaffer, R. (2000). Military training-related injuries: surveillance, research, and prevention. *American journal of preventive medicine*, *18*(3), 54-63.

[28] Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping. *International Relations*, *11*(3), 201-218.

is a clear indication that if involved member states work together on security policies with a common goal in their respective regional and continental levels then greater achievements in peace and security will be realized.

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study adopted an exploratory and mixed methods research design. According to Streb[29], exploratory research designs suffice where there are limited or fewer studies, important for obtaining background information about a given topic and is flexible, able to address a variety of research questions. Mixed methods approach allows for investigation of a broader and complex research problem enabling the researcher to utilize more than one approach, both quantitative and qualitative approach of data collection.[30] Consequently, the approach produces complete knowledge and understanding of the research problem hence chosen by the researcher for the investigation into the role of military diplomacy in peace and security in Horn of Africa Region, the case of AMISOM in Somalia.

The study target population entailed AMISOM staff who relevant respondents provided sufficient information to answer the research questions. Currently, AMISOM has 22,000 military troops, 234 police officers and 81 civilians (AMISOM, 2018). Moreover, the study equally targeted the Somali civilian population since they were important stakeholders in providing information on the effectiveness of military diplomacy in the country. Thus, the target population comprised 22,315 AMISOM staff and civilian contingent. The sample size for this study was obtained from a sampling formula by Yamane;[31]

$n = N1 + N(e)^2 = 99.9$
Where:
n= the sample size
N = the size of population
e= the error of 10%
The calculation from a population of 22,315 AMISOM Staff and Civilian contingent was:

$= 223151 + 22315(.1)2 = 99.9$

Therefore, a target sample of 100 respondents was chosen from the AMISOM Staff at the proportions as indicated on Table 1 below.

Table 1
Sample Size

categories AMISOM Component	Population size	Sample size	Sampling Procedure
Military	22000	50	Purposive Sampling
Police contingent of AMISOM	234	30	Purposive Sampling
Civilian contingent of AMISOM	81	20	Purposive Sampling
TOTAL	22,315	100	

This study employed a breadth of both primary and secondary sources for data collection. Primary data was being collected from study respondents by means of a research questionnaire and an interview schedule. This comprised a set of well-structured and unstructured questions defined by the research questions as well as interview schedules. These allowed room for detailed responses from the study respondents. For reliability and validity of the findings, relevant documents constituting AMISOM literature was reviewed to provide qualitative data for analysis.

The researcher carried out a pilot test of the research instrument. Pilot testing is important as it helped establish the suitability of the tool and any identifiable errors before undertaking the study. The researcher carried out a pilot study at the East African Standby Force headquarters in Karen, on a sample of 20 respondents.

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[29] Streb, Christoph Klaus. "Exploratory case studies." Encyclopedia of case study research (2010): 372-373.
[30] Tashakorri, Abbas and John W. Creswell. "The New Era of Mixed Methods." *Journal of Mixed Methods Research* 1 (January 2007): 3-7
[31] Yamane, Taro. "Statistics: An introductory analysis." (1973).

The data analysis process involved both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Content analysis was mainly used to analyse the qualitative data and which would be reported normatively. Quantitative research findings were analysed and reported using descriptive statistics, tables, graphs, charts and inferential statistics in Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS v23). Moreover, the data analysis was structured objectively to address each of the study research questions.

IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

This section presents the findings of the study. The study sought to explore the key challenges facing AMISOM in military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa. The findings are presented in the following section.

5.1 Challenges facing AMISOM in military diplomacy According to Secondary Data Sources
5.1.1 Negative Local Perception of AMISOM

Somalia perception of the AMISOM operations have improved over time and AU has been struggling to win the trust and support of the Somalia elites, populace, and security forces. Negative perceptions on the AMISOM have been on the increase due to lots of local perceptions. Some of the perceptions from the locals is that; AMISOM has been a money-making enterprise to its contributing countries which has reduced the incentive to defeat the al-Shaabab; the locals also claim that AMISOM has become a vehicle for the Somalia neighbours who want to pursue their own selfish agenda. These perceptions have costed AMISOM a significant resentment that is very evident in both the leadership rank and file.[32]

Some of the aging professionals who belonged to the Somalia's Army before 1990 now found out that AMISOM's participation in peacekeeping is a reminder to the Somalia Army of how weak they have grown to be. It is a perception derived from the fact that in AMISOM, it is both Ethiopia and Kenya that play the leadership roles. To them, it sounds like an effective way of keeping the Ethiopian and the Kenyan troops occupied with a goal of keeping Somalia weak as they also manipulate the regional and local administrations to leverage over the Somalia federal government. In the past years, Kenya has been the focus of Somali criticism partly because, the KDF were seen to be conducting operations in Somalia with little knowledge of the local population; also, the troop was also accused of conducting illicit business of sugar and charcoal with the al-Shabaab.[33] These tensions began growing stronger when the Kenyan authorities began issuing concessions in the oil-producing Indian Ocean maritime boarder that Somalia claims it owns. This contention prompted an international appeal to determine the maritime boundary between Kenya and Somalia.[34]

The SNA and the rank troops are also aware that they are subordinate to AMISOM in terms of influence, stature and power even though they have always fought alongside the forces from AU without communication equipment, medical care, barracks, salaries, armoured vehicles and sophisticated weapons. This was a luxury the troops never experienced as their counterparts the AMISOM experienced all the above luxuries inclusive of good food and protection. This made the Somalia commanders become critical of the external proportions of resources that were being allocated to the AMISOM. This led to a negative perception on the AMISOM by the Somalia troops.

AMISOM has also proved to Somalia its inability to protect the Somalia nation especially when they were unable to protect the parliamentarians and since 2012, more than 4% of parliamentarians have been killed. This has brought an open criticism to AMISOM with questions regarding its performance thus, harbouring doubts of whether its long-term mission of peace keeping will be accomplished. The civil society on the other hand have also voiced their complaints on AMISOM absorbing most of the resources that would rather be used by the locals and also, they handled a lot of non-peacekeeping issues that were not necessary for their mission.[35] The presence of AMISOM has also been criticized by most civilians who were not satisfied with their interactions with the peace keepers. The civilians claimed that the AU mission focused their efforts of protection only on the top government officials and also guarded strategic facilities like the airport and the seaports of Mogadishu. The civilians also noted misconduct among the AMISOM as

[32] Williams, P.D. (2018). Strategic Communications for Peace Operations: The African Union's Information War Against al-Shabaab. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 7(1).

[33] Robinson, C. (2016). Revisiting the rise and fall of the Somali Armed Forces, 1960–2012. *Defense & Security Analysis*, 32(3), 237-252.

[34] Albrecht, P., & Haenlein, C. (2016). Fragmented Peacekeeping: The African Union in Somalia. *The RUSI Journal*, 161(1), 50-61.

[35] Roble, F. (2007). Local and Global Norms: Challenges to "Somaliland's" Unilateral Secession. *Horn of Africa*, 25, 165-196.

they killed some civilians, exploited people sexually and also conducted illicit businesses of fuel, food, sugar and charcoal. In other instances, the civilians have also accused AMISOM of their inability to prevent al-Shabaab forces obstructing their town especially in the newly liberated towns. The withdrawal of the AMISOM in the newly liberated towns also posed a lot of risk to the administrators, civilians and the Somalia Security Forces who welcomed the arrival of AU publicly in Somalia.[36]

AMISOM's decision of commandeering some of the public and private properties and converting them into military bases that is the Stadium of Mogadishu and University of Kismayo have also become a public debate. Generally, the Somalia citizens have been critiquing the presence of AMISOM in their country if it was for the promotion of peace or increment of violence.[37]

5.1.2 Funding dynamics

According to Andrews,[38] AMISOM has been unable to sustain itself with the funding from its member states and this has made it be largely dependent on external support. This is the same case with the AU that has been greatly depending on the international donors. The support from the international donors greatly sustains the peace operations that AU undertake and without this kind of support, the architecture of security will not be sustainable.[39] The problem of obtaining ammunition and other military hardware has also been a problem and eliminating the influence of the outsiders will just do more harm to the security operations.[40] The AU is generally dependant on the outsiders more than it can provide within its limits. The funding also experiences delays especially the ones from outside because of the tedious process of clearing the funds and this causes a whole delay in the process of peacekeeping.[41] Besides the tedious process, the management of AMISOM also involves too many actors and this has affected the ability of AMISOM to conduct its missions and operations according to the plans that were initially laid out.

In essence, lack of funds limits the operations that are to be carried out by creating uncertainty on the number of peacekeepers to be deployed, duration of the mission, the intensity of the operations, and the equipment required during the mission. Chances are that, whenever funds are disbursed in time, the operations of the peace missions perform better. The UN has tried to address this critical issue by establishing a voluntary trust fund to reimburse commissions for equipment to be used in such operations and also match allowances to the UN peacekeepers. The funding process has however been irregular and not adequate and has left some of the reimbursements in arrears. This has generally disrupted the supply of maintenance of essential equipment for Peace Operations in.[42] Currently, the largest AU donors are the UN, USA, and the EU. USA is the largest bilateral donor for humanitarian assistant in Somalia.[43]

5.1.3 Proxy wars

The global powers will always continue to influence the peacekeeping as long as the largest influencer and contributor remains to be the most influential member of the security council USA. Since 2007, the USA have conducted more than half a dozen missile raids on al-Shabaab using their special forces and their aircrafts. The USA has also piloted intelligence surveillance of Somalia using the drones from the installations done in Seychelles, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.[44] Since the USA troop withdrawn from Somalia in 1993, it has been reluctant to get involved in issues of Somalia. Among its fears is al-Shabaab has strong networks in the region and they might go ahead and launch terrorist attacks on the Western World.

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[36] Anzalone, C. (2016). The Resilience of al-Shabaab. *CTC Sentinel*, *9*(4), 13.

[37] Elmi, A. A. (2014). Decentralization options for Somalia. *The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies. The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies*.

[38] Andrews, K. N., & Holt, V. K. (2007). United Nations-African Union coordination on peace and security in Africa. *Issue Brief*, *3*.

[39] Ferras, P. (2013). Security stakes and challenges in the Horn of Africa. *State and Societal Challenges in the Horn of Africa*, 48.

[40] Dersso, S. A. (2010). The role and place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture. *Institute for Security Studies Papers*, *2010*(209), 24.

[41] De Coning, C., & Freear, M. (2013). Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for peace operations in Mali.

[42] De Coning, C., & Freear, M. (2013). Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for peace operations in Mali.

[43] Swan, J. (2007). US Policy in the Horn of Africa.

[44] Shinn, D. H. (2012). International Efforts to Counter Al-Shabaab. *E-International Relations*, 1-2.

The Ethiopian occupation that was being support by the major powers in the world as a way of helping to end the war on terror instead produced violent extremism which they had ironically set to combat.[45] The proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea has also paved way for the external parties to be involved with Somalia in a way they deem best. Some people who support the al-Shabaab insurgents have been on the government side of Eritrea while those who are supporting Somalia have always sided with the Ethiopian government. These two countries are therefore not aimed towards a common goal and instead key keep Somalia engaged in a war that is damaging as the wars take place inside Somalia. It is so unfortunate that the horn of Africa lacks a state of hegemony that is ready to handle political and militaristic responsibilities to ensure peace and security prevails in the region. The absence of hegemony and the hegemonic actors has had great impacts on the conflict in Somalia and this is just a clear explanation why the war has taken long.[46]

5.1.4 Lack of coordination, intelligence and capacity to conduct operations effectively

The problem of coordination between different troops involved in operations and between the AU headquarters and the major hegemonies have made the support provided by the AMISOM a challenge.[47] For instance, the troop from Kenya have been accused of working independently from the central command that comes from AMISOM.[48] The Ugandan troop has also been accused of lacking proper coordination with other countries that also contribute their troops and also for not willing to share their intelligence.[49] AMISOM lacks critical analysis, adequate intelligence, and strategic focus on its planning this is why the whole process is filled with inadequacies and lots of incoordination. This has made AMISOM find difficulties and complications in confronting with the faceless and the irregular Al-Shabaab that have tactics that are asymmetrical and guerrilla like.[50]

The terrorists seem more organized the peacekeepers themselves. This is evident from different training sites that they have put in place for their people to specialize in explosives and bomb making, suicide attacks, and kidnappings which are believed to be well managed by the Al-Qaeda trainers.[51] Gathering intelligence is more critical in AMISOM operations rather than fighting the al-Shabaab. This is because, the al-Shabaab have done hiding within the community and they cannot be easily identified and this makes them understand the local dynamics more than the international forces.[52] The al-Shabaab are also advantageous because of the language barrier that the international forces experience as well as their ability to adapt to the ever-improving IED technology. The government of Somalia has provided AMISOM with all the needed intelligence services and have gone an extra mile of connecting the population of Somalia with AMISOM. In spite of all these, the forces in Somalia are still dependent on AMISOM because AMISOM has not yet given enough personnel in this operation.[53]

5.1.5 Troops contribution

Troop's contribution as a challenge materialized from the multidimensional nature of the AMISOM mission. Actually, more or less the mission has been so disjointed that it is probably precise to reason of it as detached AMISOMs than singling it as one-unit, coherent operation. The challenge of in-house harmonization and coherence also has quite a few scopes.

First, the topographical separation of some of the significant mission components deserves mention. AMISOM's strategic planning and political work is based in different regions, the military units and operational command based in Mogadishu while the head of mission and mission analysis are based in Kenya. Notably, the international training structures for the TFG security forces are spread through Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Uganda complicates the situation

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[45] Scarlett, C. CheruFatu et al. *Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century*.

[46] Sharamo, R., & Mesfin, B. (2011). Regional security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa. *Institute for Security Studies Monographs*, *2011*(178), 436.

[47] Tadesse, M. (2009). Somalia: Bailing out the TFG. *InterAfrica Group Briefing*, 9-15.

[48] Miyandazi, L. (2012). Kenya's military intervention in Somalia: An intricate process.

[49] Dersso, S. A. (2010). Somalia dilemmas: changing security dynamics, but limited policy choices. *Institute for Security Studies Papers*, *2010*(218), 24.

[50] Oder, S., & Lisa, P. (2011). Seeking Peace in Somalia: A Review of the Impact of AMISOM Police. a Seminar on 15th April.

[51] Omar, M. (2012). Intervention in the Somali Conflict. *Managing Peace and Security in Africa: Essays on Approaches to Interventions in African Conflicts*.

[52] International Crisis Group. (2008). *Kenya in crisis* (No. 137). International Crisis Group.

[53] De Coning, C., & Freear, M. (2013). Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for peace operations in Mali.

further. A widespread mission setup hardly enables effective internal coordination of missions especially for operational and tactical issues

AMISOM internal dynamics including spread of its political leadership for instance its head of mission being based in Nairobi until the end of 2012 left military commandants in the difficult situations of acting as the principal political representative of the mission in Mogadishu. Despite acting commandants actively managing this responsibility, holding this position undermined efforts to establish a peace and reconciliation process, given the absence of a dedicated and appropriately sized military headquarters in Mogadishu until 2012. While this constraint could overcome by greater commitment to regular travel between Nairobi and Mogadishu by the heads of mission, they all failed in this aspect.[54]

A third facet of the challenges constraining AMISOM military diplomacy efforts is the ineffective organization and coordination between its troops, police and the civilian contingents. At the onset of the AMISOM peacekeeping efforts this was however absent as the state of affairs in Mogadishu then only implied it was unsuitable to engage the police and the civilian contingents. The AU only had limited civilian capacity while the police were only deployed to Mogadishu from mid-2012 following the arrival of police units from Uganda and Nigeria after undertaking training mainly outside Somalia. The arrival of civilian peacekeepers mid-2012 change the face of the peacekeeping process with considerable debate on their tasks as AMISOM progressed beyond Mogadishu getting involved in governance and stabilization issues and how these would complement military diplomacy efforts.[55]

Following the establishment of new military and strategic concepts of operations in 2012, AMISOM has had to contend with challenges in its internal dynamics following the arrival of new troop contributing countries and their redeployment across Somalia. Kenya, Sierra Leone and Djibouti signed a memorandum of understanding with the African Union although this was met by protracted debates over the financial, logistical and deployment aspects of their involvement in mission. Consequently, coordination of activities across the four areas manned by the TCCs and respective contingent commands has become a hurdle. The experience was varied though, for instance, the Djiboutian military scheduled for placement to sector four reached approximately one year late, while the Kenyan forces in sector two were particularly concerned with operational security and thus never updating progress to the AMISOM force headquarters.[56]This was particularly factual in the course of the assault on Kismayo in September 2012.

5.1.6 AMISOM Mandate

According to Williams,[57] AMISOM gave people a very complex mandate that made its mission very impossible to be achieved within a short period of time. The provided mandate has also been too ambitious to be implemented and at the same time work in the hostile environment with a small number of troops. This incompetent mandate made AMISOM an easy target for insurgents and this led to the numerous attacks they faced.[58]

AMISOM deployed a peacekeeping force in the middle of the war zone and this made al-Shabaab believe that AMISOM was not neutral in this war but instead was siding with the TFG of Somalia. In fact, the troop from Uganda were immediately shoot at immediately they arrived in Mogadishu International Airport.[59] This incident pulled the peacekeeping mission into a conflict because its forces already suffered attacks from the al-Shabaab. AMISOM's main problem was mention TGF in their mandate and this appeared to be lacking impartiality and neutrality in its peace keeping principles.[60]

Also, the AMISOM's mandate lacked a provision that they will protect their civilians but instead clearly stated that they would offer protection to the TGF and the TFI's. In other peace operations the bodies concerned with peacekeeping included the issue of protection of human rights in their mandate and many operations excluded the protection of the civilians in their mandate as one of the core mandates. Most of the military interveners tend to offer

[54] Williams, P. D. (2013). Fighting for peace in Somalia: AMISOM's seven strategic challenges. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, *17*(3-4), 222-247.

[55] De Coning, C., & Freear, M. (2013). Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for peace operations in Mali.

[56] Williams, P. D. (2013). AMISOM in transition: The future of the African Union Mission in Somalia. *Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper*, *13*.

[57] Williams, P. D. (2011). Pathways to peace in the Horn of Africa: what role for the United States?

[58] Oder, S., & Lisa, P. (2011). Seeking Peace in Somalia: A Review of the Impact of AMISOM Police. a Seminar on 15th April.

[59] Omar, M. (2012). Intervention in the Somali Conflict. *Managing Peace and Security in Africa: Essays on Approaches to Interventions in African Conflicts*.

[60] Dersso, S. A. (2010). Somalia dilemmas: changing security dynamics, but limited policy choices. *Institute for Security Studies Papers*, *2010*(218), 24.

priority to their own security and have the civilian security come second. This can be reversed and a crucial role be taken in ensuring the general population is protected and is indicated within the mandate.[61]

The force that was employed by the TFG, AMISOM and the Ethiopian forces in a collective manner made some observers conclude that both the peacekeepers and the enemies were committing crimes against humanity. This was witnessed in Somalia and abuses of civilians undermined the legitimacy of the peace operations in the nation.[62] When AMISOM was established, the only lack it had was a clear set of mandates that ensured the protection of civilians. This was mainly attributed to the fact that there was an implicit understanding that the peacekeeping mission was to be taken over by a better and more capable peacekeeping force, the UN.[63] It took AMISOM some time to realize the depth destruction its operations had caused on civilian lives as well as acknowledging the responsibility they had on the lost civilian lives because of their use of rocket fire and mortar artillery. This made the AMISOM to change its military rules of engagement and focus on accommodating the civilian casualties.[64]

The AU began shifting focus and attention to the civilians late in 2010. Therefore, a significant number of casualties dropped from because the AU incorporated the protection of the civilians in its operations. In spite of this, some significant gaps could still be noted and this required a timely attention by the AU for its operations to be termed credible to Somalis. This was a challenge that that AMISOM faced and at the same time, they had to fight back the insurgents. In 2012, AMISOM troops increased but AMISOM still remained understaffed and under-funded. The implementation of protection of civilian mandate required more resources that seemed so hard to be allocated.[65]

5.2 Challenges Facing AMISOM in military diplomacy according to Primary Data Sources

The study further sought to establish challenges facing AMISOM in its military diplomacy efforts in Somalia. Findings are presented in the figure 1 below.


Figure 1
Challenges Facing AMISOM Military Diplomacy Efforts

Study findings reveal the lack of an AMISOM exit strategy as the biggest constraint in their military diplomacy efforts in Somalia. Notably, the competing interests among the TCCs that comprise AMISOM and organizational internal dynamics limit its functionality and effectiveness. However, with the increased commitment of more African

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[61]Ray, M., & Katarina, M. (2008). Peace Operations and Human Rights. New York: Routledge, 6
[62] Bellamy, A. J. (2010). *Global politics and the responsibility to protect: from words to deeds*. Routledge.
[63] Lotze, W., & Kasumba, Y. (2012). AMISOM and the Protection of Civilians in Somalia. *conflict trends*, *2012*(2), 17-24.
[64] De Coning, C., & Freear, M. (2013). Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for peace operations in Mali.
[65] Lotze, W., & Kasumba, Y. (2012). AMISOM and the Protection of Civilians in Somalia. *conflict trends*, *2012*(2), 17-24.

states to the course of peace in Somalia, "*there has been a renewed sense of optimism in AMISOM military diplomacy efforts to salvage Somalia given the pan-African outlook that greatly transformed the overall efficiency of the peacekeeping mission.*" As established in the findings, AMISOM continues to suffer an insufficiency of troops although at present things are considerably better as pointed out by a key informant who underscored: "*only few countries considering Somalia an active warzone agreed to committing their forces to AMISOM. In fact, initially it was only Uganda and Burundi, but the KDF came in while other states like Nigeria declined initially to commit their troops. Even with the commitment of Djibouti and Sierra Leone, there's much more need to expand troop levels to attain full control of Somalia.*"

The findings in figure 7 above indicate the lack of a multilateral approach in addressing security challenges as third most commonly cited challenge facing the institutions military diplomacy efforts. Insufficiency of troops, poor coordination among external partners, limited civilian component and the lack of local strategic support suffice as other key challenges inhibiting the success of military diplomacy efforts. Especially at the beginning of the mission, the poor coordination among external partners proved a great hitch, a key informant respondent said: "*initially the arguments between the UN and the AU on whether military diplomacy was an appropriate approach undermined efforts*". This is equally captured by a key informant who mentioned: "*earlier on there was widespread international pessimism across most states over the role AMISOM would play in Somalia, in Africa and even beyond. Many felt that given the earlier failures of the UN intervention, AMISOM may simply never succeed and although this has declined overtime, partly is still existent.*"

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

While competing interests may have clouded the scene at regional level, partly alluded to lack of a common approach to deal with the Somalia issue among the various countries, military diplomatic engagements by AMISOM are the most agreeable way to address regional peace and security. The study highlights the greater need for revised strategies in military diplomacy efforts and novel approaches to address competing interests among troop contributing countries that comprise AMISOM.

5.2 Recommendations

Arguably, the most important dimension of its success is hinged on the strategic unity and partnership of the different troops. At present however, the inconsistency in unity and strategic alliance among these countries continue to challenge the seamless command and probably influence the implementation of different military diplomacy strategies based on competing interests. Further, while assets remain a critical component of military diplomacy, the success of such multidimensional peace operations is equally anchored on a civilian component and the need for civilian capabilities. The realization of effective peacemaking and peacekeeping calls for efficient management structures at the field and in Addis for strategic and support of mission teams. AMISOM currently experiences an insufficient institutional capacity and human resources required to effectively handle complex peace operations and peacemaking initiatives. Recent assessment reveals the institution bureaucratic processes are still weak.

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